Abstract For a controlled stochastic differential equation with a Bolza type performance functional, a variational formula for the functional in a given control process direction is derived, by means of backward stochastic differential equations. As applications, some Pontryagin type maximum principles are established for optimal controls of control problems, for saddle points of open-loop two-person zero-sum differential games, and for Nash equilibria of N -person nonzero-sum differential games. The results presented in this paper generalizes/simplifies the relevant ones found in [12] [17]. In addition, a sufficient existence condition of Nash equilibria is proved for nonzero-sum games.
Introduction.
Let (Ω, F, lF, lP) be a complete filtered probability space, on which a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion W (·) is defined with lF = {F t } t≥0 being its natural filtration, augmented by all lP-null sets in F. We consider a controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE, for short):
(1.1) 
dx(t) = b(t, x(t), u(t))dt + σ(t, x(t), u(t))dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ], x(0)
=
f (t, x(t), u(t))dt + h(x(T )) ,
where b, σ, f , and h are given maps taking values in Euclidean spaces lR n , lR n×d , lR n , and lR n , respectively. More assumptions will be made in the next section. In the above, x(·) is the (controlled) state process valued in lR n , and u(·) is the control process valued in some set U ⊆ lR m (bounded or unbounded). Let us indicate some special cases of the above setting. When N = 1, one can formulate an optimal control problem with state equation ( then one has a two-person zero-sum differential game. In addition, (1.1)-(1.2) covers the so-called multi-objective problems (which will be carefully discussed in a forthcoming paper). Indeed, (1.1)-(1.2) gives a very general model for a wide class of (stochastic) optimization problems. For optimal control problems, zero-sum or nonzero-sum differential games, one is mainly interested in optimal controls, saddle points, and Nash (or other type) equilibria. We may generally refer to them as extreme controls.
The purpose of this paper is to present necessary conditions for extreme controls in a unified way. The main idea is to derive a variational formula for the performance functional vector in certain given "control process direction", by means of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs, for short) and duality principle. Since U may be non-convex, spike variations have to be used as the perturbation of the control process. A little different from [12] and [17] , neither the variational systems nor the corresponding Taylor type expansions of the state process and the performance functional (with respect to a control variation) will be used. Instead, we first express the change of the performance functional directly in terms of the Hamiltonian and associated first order and second order adjoint systems (which are BSDEs). Then we obtain a representation for the variation and "directional derivative" of the performance functional. This idea of using the adjoint systems alone is very natural because the statement of Pontryagin type maximum principle involves only the adjoint systems, not the variational systems. Similar idea is used in [15] for optimal control of variational inequalities. This paper is organized as follows. The assumptions, notations and some basic estimates (Proposition 2.1, Corollary 2.1) are given in Section 2. In Section 3, we obtain two representations (first order and second order) for the difference of the performance functional in terms of the Hamiltonian and adjoint processes (Lemma 3.1). These representations may be of interest in their own right. In Section 4 we use the second order representation in Section 3 to derive a representation for the variation and "directional derivative" of the performance functional along with any spike variation (Theorem 4.1).
In Section 5, we apply the "directional derivative" formula from Section 4 to generalize the classical maximum principle for stochastic optimal controls (Theorem 5.1) and derive extreme principles for Nash equilibria of nonzero-sum games (Theorem 5.2) and minimax principle for saddle points of a zero-sum game (Theorem 5.3). In Section 6, we use the first order difference representation in Section 3 to obtain a sufficient condition for Nash equilibria of a nonzero-sum game (Theorem 6.2). Theorem 6.2 shows that open-loop Nash equilibria exist under reasonable conditions. While equilibria of other types (closed-loop, strategies, etc.) are commonly considered for differential games, all of them (if exist) induce open-loop controls. A natural question is whether they induce open-loop Nash equilibria. This question is one of our motivations for studying open-loop equilibria of differential games; see [11] and [16] for some recent results on linear-quadratic stochastic games.
Assumptions and Basic Estimates
In this section we will make some preliminaries. First of all, besides the Euclidean space lR n and the matrix space lR n×d (of all (n × d) matrices), we let S n be the set of all (n × n) symmetric matrices. For any x, y ∈ lR n , we use x T y and x · y to denote the inner product of these two vectors. For a function ϕ : lR n → lR, denote by ∇ x ϕ = ϕ x its gradient (as a column vector) and ∇ 2 x ϕ = ϕ xx its Hessian (a symmetric matrix).
is the corresponding
In what follows, C represents a generic constant, which can be different from line to line.
Next we introduce some spaces of random variables and stochastic processes. For
where ||ϕ|| α,β and ||ϕ|| ∞,β are norms defined as
a.e., a.s. . Now we introduce the following standing assumptions.
(S1) The control space U ⊆ lR m is nonempty.
and h : lR n × Ω → lR n satisfy the following:
is twice continuously differentiable with all the partial derivatives of b, σ, f , and h with respect to x up to order 2 being continuous in (x, u) with appropriate growths. More
The set of admissible controls is defined as
The following result gives the well-posedness of the state equation as well as some useful estimates. 
Further, ifx(·) is the unique solution corresponding to
for all γ ≥ 1.
Proof. The existence and uniqueness of the strong solution to (1.1) follows from the contraction mapping theorem in the usual manner. We now prove (2.3). Suppose 
Note that the constant C > 0 in (2. 
Since the step-length δ > 0 will not shrink, by induction, we obtain (2.3).
Note that under (iii) of (S2), we have
So the second inequality (2.3) follows.
In the same fashion, we can prove (2.4).
Note that for any u(·) ∈ U β [0, T ] (with β ≥ 1), the right hand side of (2.3) is finite. By assumption (S2), we have
Hence, combining Proposition 2.1 with the assumption on f and h, we see that for any β ≥ 2, the performance functional vector
Note that (2.10)
So the performance functional vector J(u(·)) is also well-defined on L β F (0, T ; U ) for β ≥ 2. While we will focus on the admissible set U β [0, T ] in this paper, all of the results obtained in this paper for
, the change of the state (the left hand side of (2.4)) is controlled by the perturbation ofū(·) to u(·). Here γ might be larger than β.
From the estimates in Proposition 2.1, we obtain
ū(·)) and (x(·), u(·)) be two admissible pairs, and ∆x(·) = x(·) −x(·). Then there exist a constant C > 0 independent onū(·) and u(·) such that
where
Proof. The first inequality follows from (2.3) written in norms. To prove the second inequality, we use (2.4). By assumption (S2), we have that for ϕ = b and σ,
By (2.4) in Proposition 2.1 with γ = β,
Representations for Difference of the Performance Functional Vector
For given maps b, σ, f , and h satisfying (S1)-(S2), we define the associated Hamiltonian as follows:
For any given admissible pair (x(·),ū(·)), we introduce the following system of linear BSDEs:
with {(p (·), q (·)), 1 ≤ ≤ N } being the (unique) adapted solution of (3.2). We call (3.2) and (3.3) the first and the second adjoint equations of (1.1)-(1.2), respectively. We also refer to the adapted solutions (3.3) as the first order and the second order adjoint processes associated with (x(·),ū(·)), respectively. We have the following result concerning the unique solvability of (3.2) and (3.3).
Proposition 3.1. Let (S1)-(S2) hold and (x(·),ū(·)) be an admissible pair withū(·)
∈ U β [0, T ] (β > 1). Then (3
.2) and (3.3) admit unique adapted solutions, respectively.
Moreover, the following estimates hold:
Proof. By the definition of H , we have
Hence, by (S2) and [6] , we can find a unique adapted solution
This proves estimate (3.5).
Next, by (S2), we have
Hence, by [6] , we have the existence and uniqueness of adapted solution to (3.3). Moreover, (3.10) lE sup
This proves (3.6).
We point out that for N ≥ 2, when the admissible pair (x(·),ū(·)) is given, BSDEs (3.2) consists of N decoupled BSDEs. However, when (ū(·)) ≡ (ū 1 (·), · · · ,ū N (·)) is, say, a Nash equilibrium, then the corresponding optimality system will be a system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs, for short), in which all the components will be coupled through the necessary conditions satisfied by the componentsū (·) ofū(·). We will see this clearer later. The same remark applies to BSDE system (3.3). Now let (x ε (·), u ε (·)) be another admissible pair. Our first main result gives two representations for the difference J(u ε (·)) − J(ū(·)) in terms of the Hamiltonian and adjoint processes associated with (x(·),ū(·)), as well as other relevant expressions. To state the result, let us introduce the following notations:
and (3.12)
x(t),ū(t), p(t), q(t))∆x(t).
The definitions of ∆ k xu f (t), ∆ k xu b(t), and ∆ k xu σ i (t) (with k = 0, 1, 2) are similar to the above.
Lemma 3.1. Let (S1)-(S2) hold. Let (x(·),ū(·)) be any admissible pair, whose associated Hamiltonian is H, and the associated first and second order adjoint processes
where σ i x (t) is the same as in (3.4) .
We refer to the first equality in (3.13) as the first order representation, and to the second equality in (3.13) as the second order representation, respectively, for the difference
Proof. By (1.2), we have (note (3.11) and (3.12)) (3.14)
Applying Itô's formula, we have (note (3.12)) (3.16)
Hence, by (3.14),
proving the first equality in (3.13).
Next, we let {(P (·), Q (·)), 1 ≤ ≤ N } be the unique adapted solution of (3.3). Denote the drift term in (3.3) by R (t). By Ito's formula and equations (3.15), (3.3), we have (with t suppressed)
Hence, (3.19)
This proves the second equality in (3.13).
A Variational Formula for the Performance Functional Vector
In this section, we will obtain a directional derivative for J(·) at a given admissible control processū(·) ∈ U β [0, T ] in any given "control process direction". We will make this clear shortly. Since U is not necessarily convex, one has to consider spike variations ofū(·). Let
where |G| stands for the Lebesgue measure of G.
otherwise.
Letx(·) and x ε (·) be the state processes withx(0) = x ε (0) ∈ lR n corresponding to the controlsū(·) and
Compare the notations here with those in (3.11) and (3.12).
Recall that under (S1)-(S2), if U is convex, and all the maps involved are also differentiable in u, then by usual convex perturbation, one can show that the map u(·) → J (u(·)) is Gâteaux differentiable, and the directional derivative in the direction of v(·) is linear in v(·); see [2] and [4] . Now by making spike perturbation, which is applicable for general U , we obtain the above "directional derivative" which is not linear in the "direction" v(·). Hence, the above "directional derivative" is significantly different from Gâteaux directional derivative.
A similar result was proved in [12] under the assumption that
Ideally, one should be able to prove (4.4) forū(·) ∈ U 2 [0, T ] because the optimal control is well-posed in this space.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is divided into two parts. In Part I, we construct G ε ∈ G ε that satisfy the second equality in (4.4). Then in Part II, we show that the resulting spike variation u ε (·) satisfies the first equality in (4.4) as well.
For Part I of the proof, we need the following lemma.
The proof of the above result is essentially the same as a result found in [9] . For readers' convenience, we present a proof here.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Since ψ
Note that we can always choose the partition {t j } 0≤j≤n+1 independent of i = 1, · · · , k. Now we let
Then |G| = εT . Thus, G ∈ G ε , and (4.10)
Hence, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
By letting ε → 0+, we obtain (4.6).
Proof of Theorem 4.1 (Part I).
In this part we construct G ε ∈ G ε for ε ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies the second equality of (4.4). Denote by ψ 0 (·) and η(·) the following processes.
(4.12)
where ρ appears in assumption (S2). We claim
Indeed, by (2.3) or (2.11), we know that ||x(·)|| ∞,β ≤ C. So Proposition 3.1 and (4.12) imply that
ψ 0 (·), η(·) ∈ L β F (Ω; L 2 (0, T ;
lR)). By assumption (S2), for ϕ = b and σ, (4.14) |∆ u ϕ(t, v(t))| = |ϕ(t,x(t), v(t)) − ϕ(t,x(t),ū(t))|
It follows that
Since β > 3, by (3.6) in Proposition 3.1 and the fact
This, combined with (4.15), implies that H(·, v(·))
∈ L 1 F (Ω; L 1 (0, T ;
lR)). By Lemma 4.1 (or its proof) applied to H (·, v(·)
) and ψ 0 (·), we obtain the existence of G ε ∈ G ε for ε ∈ (0, 1) such that (4.17) lE
where C = lE .4) for G ε .
Now we prepare to go Part II of the proof of Theorem 4.1. Let ψ 0 and η be defined in (4.12). For ε > 0, define
We will see that ψ ε (·) appears many times in the proof of Theorem 4.1, Part II. We need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 hold. Choose G ε to satisfy (4.17) and (4.18), and let I ε (t) be the characteristic function of G ε . Let x ε (·) be the state process with x ε (0) =x(0) corresponding to u ε (·) defined in (4.2). Let ∆x(·) = x ε (·) −x(·).
Then for α ∈ (0, β] and γ > 0, (4.19) lE sup
Moreover, for λ = 0, 1 and θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 with
the following holds. 
For (4.20), we may assume that γ = 1 sinceω (·) γ is just another modulus of continuity. For each δ > 0, there exists a constant
Choosing δ small enough and then letting ε be sufficiently small, we obtain (4.20). 
2,β . However, with the convention (·) 0 = 1, (4.23) holds for all θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 in (4.21). Now we estimate the terms in (4.23). By (2.11) and (4.19), ||x ε || ∞,β ≤ C. By (4.18) again, ||ψ 0 I ε || 2,β ≤ Cε 
The inequalities in (4.24) can be combined as, for λ = 0 or 1,
Substituting (4.25) into (4.23), we obtain (4.22):
We are ready for Part II of the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 (Part II).
For convenience, we rewrite (3.13) below (4.27)
We list the following claims:
If the above are all proved, then (4.27) becomes (4.32)
Here we used the fact that H (t, u ε (t)) = H (t, v(t))I ε (t). This implies the first equality in (4.4).
We now prove (4.28)-(4.31).
Proof of (4.28): We note that (4.33)
Hence, by assumption (S2), (4.19), and (4.20) with γ = β β−2 to obtain (4.34)
which proves (4.28).
Proof of (4.29): Recalling the definitions (3.12) and (4.3) of ∆ 2 xu H(t) and ∆ u H(t, u ε (t)), we have (suppressing t and (p , q ) when it is clear) (4.35)
by ( 
Also, by (4.22) with (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 , λ) = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1) and (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) , respectively, (4.38)
Combining (4.35)-(4.38), we obtain (4.29).
Proof of (4.30): In fact, we have (suppressing t) (4.39)
Similarly,
Hence, by (4.22) with (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 , λ) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) and (0, 1, 3, 1, 0), respectively, we have
proving (4.30).
Proof of (4.31): We let (4.42)
By assumption (S2), |R i (t)| ≤ 2L|∆x(t)|. Therefore we have (with arguments suppressed)
To finish the proof, another bound for |R i (t)| is needed. Rewrite R i (t) as follows. (4.44)
For a fixed τ ∈ (0, min{β − 3, 1}), by assumption (S2), we have
Thus, by (4.44) and (4.45), we obtain another bound for R i (t):
Substituting (4.46) into (4.43), and using (4.22) with (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 , θ 4 , λ) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (0, 1, 2, 1, 1) and (0, 1, 2 + τ, 1, 0), respectively, we obtain (4.47)
This proves (4.31).
Pontryagin Type Extreme Principles
In this section we apply the directional derivative formula established in the previous section to optimal controls and equilibria of differential games.
We first look at the case N = 1, i.e., the classical stochastic optimal control problem which can be stated as follows.
J(u(·)).
Anyū(·) ∈ U β [0, T ] satisfying the above is called an optimal control of Problem (C), the corresponding state processx(·) is called an optimal state process, and (x(·),ū(·)) is called an optimal pair. The following result is referred to as Pontryagin type maximum principle, which is a set of first order necessary conditions for optimal controls. For optimal controls satisfying (4.5), the maximum principle is proved in [12] . Assuming more restrictive growth conditions for f and h, the maximum principle is proved in [17] . See [3] , [5] , [7] , [10] , [13] , [14] , and [18] for related works. 
x(t), v, p(t), q(t)) − H(t,x(t),ū(t), p(t), q(t))
that is,
Proof. Let us suppress (t,x(t), p(t), q(t)). For any v(·)
Now if (5.2) fails, then there would be a v 0 ∈ U such that for some δ > 0, the set
has the property that
Now we let
, and with this v(·), we have a violation of (5.4).
Putting the corresponding state equation, the first and second adjoint equations together, we obtain the following optimality system for an optimal control:
Note that the above is a coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE, for short), with the coupling presented in the last minimum condition.
Next, we consider the case N ≥ 2. This is an N -person stochastic differential game. There are a lot of situations in the area that one can discuss; see [1] for a general exposition. Here, we only consider the so-called non-cooperative differential games, namely, the -th player in the game would like to minimize his/her own cost functional J (u(·), regardless of other players' cost functionals. To make it precise, let
For notational convenience, we introduce
Obviously, J (u(·)) not only depends on u (·), but also depends on u k (·), k = . Hence, the optimal control/strategy of Player depends on the controls/stragies of other players. Therefore, we need to introduce the following notion.
is called an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game if the following holds:
Similar to Theorem 5.1, we have the following Pontryagin type maximum principle for Nash equilibria of the N -person stochastic differential game.
is a Nash equilibrium of the game with each β > 3. (3.2) and (3.3) such that
x(t),ū(t), p(t), q(t))
The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 5.1, because for any 1 ≤ ≤ N , when u k (·) (k = ) are given,ū (·) is an optimal control problem with the state equation We point out that condition (5.7) gives couplings among (ū (·), p (·), q (·), P (·)) for different 1 ≤ ≤ N . Similar to the case N = 1, we may also write down the optimality system for (
Due to the minimum condition (5.8), it is not hard for us to see that the optimality system is not decoupled (with respect to 1 ≤ ≤ N ). In fact, if for given for t ∈ [0, T ], (ū 1 (t), · · · ,ū N (t)) is a solution of (5.8), then we expect that (5.9)
Therefore, plugging the above into (1.1), (3.2), and (3.3), we obtain a couple system of FBSDEs. Solving that system will lead to a candidate for the Nash equilibria of the game. We prefer to omit the details here. 
x(t),ū(t))
T P (t) σ i (t,x(t), u 1 , u 2 ) − σ i (t,x(t),ū(t)) ,
the following holds: (5.13) H(t,ū 1 (t), u 2 ) ≤ H(t,ū 1 (t),ū 2 (t)) ≤ H(t, u 1 ,ū 2 (t)), (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U 1 × U 2 , a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
The proof is pretty straightforward. We may refer (5.13) as a minimax condition.
Sufficient Conditions for Nash Equilibria
In this section, we use the first order representation in Lemma 3.1 to prove a sufficient condition forū
to be a Nash equilibrium of the nonzero-sum game in Theorem 5.2. The proof follow directly from a generalization of the sufficient condition for optimal control proved in [17] .
We need the concept of partial subgradient. For a function ϕ defined on a convex subset D of lR n × lR m , the partial subgradient ∂ u ϕ of ϕ at (x, u) ∈ D is defined as 
(t), q(t)) defined by (3.2) andū(·) satisfies, for all t ∈ [0, T ], (i) h(x) is convex in x and H(t, x, u, p(t), q(t)) is convex in x and u. (ii) 0 ∈ ∂ u H(t,x(t),ū(t), p(t), q(t)).

Thenū(t) is an optimal control.
Proof. Let (x(t),ū(t)) be an admissible pair withū(t) in Theorem 6.1 and (p(·), q(·)) being the associated first order adjoint processes. Let (x(t), u(t)) be any admissible pair.
Note that assumption (S2*) is sufficient for deriving the first order representation in Lemma 3.1, which can be written as 
H(x, u) − H(x,ū) = H(t, x(t), u(t), p(t), q(t)) − H(t,x(t),ū(t), p(t), q(t)).
